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Smith W. Brookhart and Russia
Ronald F. Briley
THE RESULTS OF THE SENATORIAL elections of 1922 in the
Midwest shocked the nation. The farmers of this region, in the
midst of an agricultural depression, had selected proponents of
radical agricuhural legislation to be their spokesmen: Lynn
Frazier of North Dakota. Robert Howell of Nebraska. Henrik
Shipstead of Minnesota, and Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa.
The legislative activities of these men constituted an attempt to
confront the farm problems raised by the agricultural depression
of 1920.'
Frazier, Howell. Shipstead. and Brookhart have generally
been characterized as isolationists. Historians have argued that
the Midwest is geographically isolated from foreign affairs, eco-
nomically self-sufficient, a Republican area which has disap-
proved of the foreign interventions of Democratic presidents, and
a section dominated by European ethnic groups which wanted to
avoid entanglements in the difficulties of their former home
lands.'
Wayne S. Cole, in his biography of North Dakota Senator
Gerald P. Nye. argues that Nye's isolationist views stemmed from
his allegiance to the forces of agrarianism. In domestic politics.
Nye was opposed to business, industrial, and financial interests,
which he perceived as being detrimental to agricultural interests.
'Ronald F. Briley, "Challenge to Normalcy: Four Midwestern Political
Mavericks. 1922-1924" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, West Texas State University,
1972).
'Ray A. Blllington, "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism." Political
Science Quarterly. LX (March, 1945), 44-63; Samuel Lubell. The Future of
American Politics (New York. 1951). 131-156.
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He supported neutrality legislation because international con-
flicts such as World War I had benefited business, industry, and
finance, while harming agriculture.' Another historian. Selig
Adler, also has commented upon the importance of the American
agrarian tradition in shaping a policy of isolation. Adler contends
that the American reluctance to become involved in foreign af-
fairs is in part due to a feeling of superiority, based upon the be-
lief that the world is dependent upon American wheat supplies.*
If the agrarian sector has traditionally produced isolationist
attitudes, then it seems logical that the midwestern representa-
tives elected in 1922 could be assigned to the isolationist ranks.
Nevertheless, a review of the senatorial careers of Frazier, Howell,
Shipstead, and Brookhart reveals that all of these men expressed
some interest in foreign affairs. Brookhart, especially, is an ex-
ception to the assumption that agrarian-oriented leaders of the
Midwest wished to remain aloof from foreign affairs.* The activ-
ities of Smith Brookhart suggest that a policy of internationalism
can exist without formal political and legal attachments.
In 1923 Brookhart traveled to Europe. He returned from his
journey impressed by what he had seen in Russia and the
Scandinavian nations. Acting upon these favorable impressions,
he launched a campaign for American recognition of Russia.
Brookhart openly expressed his interest in Russia to his Iowa con-
stituency, and was not subsequently censured by the voters of that
state. Brookhart's interest in Russia raises some important ques-
tions regarding the assumption that midwestern agrarianism un-
equivocally supported isolationism in the 1920s.
Smith W. Brookhart was born in Scotland County, Missouri,
on February 2, 1869, in a log cabin, a very auspicious background
for a politician whose appeal would be to the farmers of a de-
pressed agricultural area." In 1879 the Brookhart family moved to
'Wayne S. Cote, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations
(Minneapolis, I%2), 4-13.
'Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New
York. 1957), 22.
^Historians have often defined isolationism narrowly, construing it to mean a
freedom from binding political commitments. Selig Adler. Vticenain Giant.
¡92I-Í94I: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (New York, 1965). 80;
Robert James Maddox. "Another Look at the Legend of Isolationism in the
192O's," Mid-America. LUI (Jan., 1971). 37.
'For a good background of Smith Brookhart's early years see Ray S. John-
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Smith W. Brookhart
Iowa where their young son. Smith, would later fight his political
battles. Brookhart attended Iowa schools until his graduation
from Southern Iowa Normal School in 1889, when he went into
the teaching field. Tiring of teaching, he took and passed the
state bar exam in 1892.
ston, "Smith Wildman Brookhart: Iowa's Last Populist" (unpublished M.A.
Thesis, State University of Iowa, 1%4).
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Like many of his counterparts, Brookhart's interest in law
soon led into politics. Iowa still identified with the legacy of
Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War, and a large number of
G.A.R. veterans resided in the state. Brookhart affiliated with
the Republican party. Meanwhile, he continued his law practice
in Washington. Iowa, in a fashion that might only be termed
fairly successful. Indeed, his detractors would soon claim that
Brookhart's law practice or more accurately, tbe lack of it. was
the reason he turned to politics as a career.'
For whatever reason, it was obvious that Smith Brookhart did
have a strong interest in politics. After serving three terms as
Washington County Attorney, interrupted by a voluntary enlist-
ment in the Iowa National Guard for the Spanish American War.
he desired to climb the political ladder. His next political objec-
tive was a seat in Congress. Unfortunately, in order to go to Con-
gress from Washington County and the First Congressional Dis-
trict, it was first necessary to make peace with tbe Burlington rail-
road and its political representative, Joseph W. Blythe, who con-
trolled tbe politics of the district and much of the state.* Brook-
hart's insurgent nature, bordering on both courage and stub-
bornness, prevented him from making an accommodation with
Blythe. With his future political advancement blocked by the rail-
roads. Brookhart, by 1901, had become a political disciple of
Albert B. Cummins who was the leader of the progressive forces
in Iowa.
Brookhart's alliance with the progressive elements in the
Cummins' camp produced little tangible results for his political
career. In 1910 he was defeated in the Republican primary for the
Congressional seat from the First Congressional District.
With his political future momentarily blocked, Brookhart
turned to a new field, that of journalism. In December of 1911, he
purchased the Washington County Press and began his career as
a progressive editor." In his role as editor. Brockhart was con-
'Reinhard H. Luthin. "Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa: Insurgent
Agrarian Politician," Agricultural History. XXV (Oct.. 1951), 187.
'Chester H, Rowell. "Brookhart. Howell. and 'Brother Charley' Bryan,"
Worlds Work. XLVI (Sept.. 1923). 480.
•• Brookhart's journalism career is a greatly ignored part of his life. The above
discussion of this aspect of his life is taken from Johnston. "Smith Wildman
Brookhart: Iowa's Last Populist," 43-76.
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cerned with what he believed to be a business oligarchy that was
increasingly extending its influence over the government. As a
corrective measure he proposed the extension of such political re-
forms as the direct primary, recall, initiative, and referendum.
On some questions, though, Brookhart went much further than
many of his progressive colleagues; he proposed government
ownership of utilities, transportation, and communication
facilities.
After World War I, Brookhart turned against his old progres-
sive friend Albert Cummins. Cummins, as a United States
senator, had sponsored the Esch-Cummins Act which returned
the railroads to private ownership after the war with a very
generous guarantee of return on their investments. Cummins'
action alienated various railway labor groups; consequently they
backed Brookhart as a candidate to oppose Cummins in the 1920
senatorial Republican primary."* Brookhart, however, was un-
able to defeat his former political ally.
Despite his many political setbacks, Brookhart ran for the
Senate in 1922, emphasizing economic issues in his campaign. He
proposed cooperative marketing, repeal of the Esch-Cummins
Act. changes in the Federal Reserve System which he contended
was unfair to the farmer, a payment of a soldier's bonus, and in
general he opposed the vested interests of wealth and what he
termed "the non-partisan league of Wall Street."" Brookhart
won the election.
In December of 1922, the new Republicati senator from Iowa
arrived in Washington carrying with him a reputation for having
a somewhat uncivilized character and personality. He was ques-
tioned by reporters about his middle name, Wildman. To this in-
quiry, Brookhart replied, "Wildman is a good name. It is my
mother's name; it is English. But it is also notice to the stand-
patters that I am one Progressive who won't be tamed."'^
Brookhart departed in the summer of 1923 for a tour of
Europe. His journey, however, was to be quite different from
those undertaken by other American politicians in 1923. The
'"Jerry A. Neprash, The Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa. 1920-1926 (New
York. 1932). 32.
"Des Moinvs Register. April 19, 1922.
"RayTucker and Frederick R. Barkley, Sons of the Wild Jackass (Boston,
1932). 344.
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purpose of the expedition, he said, was to bring the international
rifle matches to America and to investigate the development of
cooperatives in Europe." He was accompanied by Dr. Alfred
Pearce Dennis, a representative of the Commerce Department.
Dennis traveled with Brookhart through fifteen European na-
tions, but he was not allowed to enter Russia with the Senator as
he was an official representative of the United States government
which did not recognize Soviet Russia.
Dennis, in an account later published in the Saturday Evening
Post, described the discomforts he suffered traveling with the
Iowan. He complained that Brookhart did not "drink, dance,
smoke, play cards, cuss, or tell shady stories."'* No traditional
European tourist attractions such as palaces, cathedrals, or art
galleries were visited by the Brookhart expedition. Brookhart ex-
plained that he was interested only in the future of Europe, and
was content to let the "dead past bury its dead."'* The Iowa
senator traveled light, carrying only one small bag. and sought to
curtail expenses. The Des Moines Register reported that other
senators and congressmen visiting London in the summer of 1923
made reservations at the Carlton and Ritz, hotels with rates be-
ginning at six dollars per day. while Brookhart stayed at the
Y.M.C.A. where he was able to obtain a bed and breakfast for
$1.25. '" The idiosyncrasies of Brookhart, however, should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that he believed he was engaged in an
important fact-finding endeavor.
Brookhart was investigating the cooperative movement in
Europe. No task could have been of more significance to the
Iowan, as he maintained that cooperative marketing was the solu-
tion for the problems of the American farmer. Brookhart's faith
in the cooperative system led him even beyond national borders.
In the Senate, he declared. "The cooperative ownership, develop-
"Brookhart was an internationally known rifle expert, and had been an in-
structor in marksmanship for the United States Army in World War 1. Brook-
hart's account of his 1923 European journey can be found in Smith Wildman
Brookhart. "What I Really Saw and Learned in Europe in 1923." Saturday
Evening Past. CCll (March 15. 1930). 23. 165-169.
"Alfred Pearce Dennis. "The European Education of Senator Brookhart,"
Saturday Evening Post. CCII (Dec. 14, 1929), 11.
'^Brookhart, "What I Really Saw and Learned in Europe in 1923," Saturday
Evening Post. CCII (March 15. 1930). 23.
'"Des Moines Register, July 6, 1923.
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ment, and distribution of property is the natural and the rightful
way for all the peoples of the world."" Brookhart believed that
the cooperative method was a basis upon which all the people of
the world could engage in fair trade and equal association.
Even before his departure for Europe, Brookhart's admira-
tion for the cooperative method had brought him into a political
controversy. In February of 1923, he urged Congress to prohibit
all interstate commerce not conducted under federal charter and
the cooperative system. Irving Lenroot. senator from Wisconsin,
labeled Brookhart's proposal as class legislation similar to that of
the Russian Bolsheviks. Lenroot charged that not even Lenin
would think of advocating such a plan.'* Lenroot's accusations
were similiar to other charges hurled against the Iowa Senator
after his return from Russia.
Meanwhile, in Europe Brookhart was finding new sources of
inspiration for his faith in the cooperative idea. He discovered to
his satisfaction that cooperatives in Europe were increasing in
membership and prosperity. He was most impressed by the
growth of the movement following World War I. While other
businesses had receded after the war, cooperatives had tripled
their volume of business." Cooperatives in Denmark particularly
impressed Brookhart; he explained in an article for the Des
Moines Register that farmers in Denmark were obtaining a
square deal because they were organized. Organization enabled
them to dominate the Danish parliament, and control their
processing and purchasing through cooperatives. Brookhart drew
what he considered important conclusions from the Danish situa-
tion for the American farmer.
With the economic power which such an organization would afford,
the American farmers could end the beef trust, the sugar trust, the
tobacco trust, the cement trust, and finally all of the great industrial
trusts that are now levying such an extortionate toll of profits upon the
American people.'"
Exhilarated by his Scandinavian investigations, Brookhart
left Dennis behind at the Russian border as he continued his
journey into that land considered by the American government to
"Congressional Record. 69 Cong.. 1 Sess. (1925-1926), LXVH, 3,279,
"New York Times. February 2, 1923.
"Brookhart. "What I Really Saw and Learned in Europe In 1923," Saturday
Evening Post. CCII (March 15. 1930). 165.
'"Des Moines Register. July 2, 1923.
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be an outlaw nation. Arriving in Moscow on June U , Brookhart
reported that the Russian wheat crop appeared to be very success-
ful, and would have an important effect on the world grain
markets. The Iowa Senator asserted, however, that the fertile
Russians crops would not adversely affect the attitude of the
American farmer toward Russia. He argued that if American
farmers would follow the example of the Russian cooperatives,
they would possess the means for gaining an equitable price for
their grain in American markets without concerning themselves
about the price of their exportable surplus.'' During his
week-long visit, Brookhart became convinced of the progress of
cooperation in Russia under Lenin. He commented, "The Soviet
government has abandoned the communistic plan for that of the
cooperative."^^ The New York Times correspondent in Moscow
insisted that Brookhart was naive in his perception of the cooper-
ative movement in Russia, that Russian cooperatives were not
operated by the peasants, but by "a bunch of Monopolistic
Bolsheviki."^' Such polemics would have little appeal to a man
who himself had been accused of Bolshevism for advocating co-
operative enterprises.
On July 15, 1923, Brookhart returned to the United States,
encouraged by what he had seen on the European continent. In
response to questions from reporters, he stated that in his travels
he had talked with the leaders of the common people and "up-
ward" movements in Europe. In regard to Russia, Brookhart
reported that he found Lenin and Trotsky to be able men.
Undoubtedly, he surprised many Americans when he said that he
would unhesitatingly recommend that the United States recog-
nize Soviet Russia—to his mind the most stable government in
the world, next to the United States.'''
In July Brookhart met with Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes to discuss his European trip; he reportedly urged the
secretary to initiate American recognition of Russia. According to
the New York Times of July 19, Brookhart argued for recognition
on the grounds that the Soviet regime was stable, and that
recognition would stabilize conditions in Europe and prevent fu-
"New York Times, June 12. 1923.
"Des Moines Register, July 18, 1923.
'-'New York Times. June 15, 1923.
^'Des Moines Register, July 18, 1923.
Smith W. Brookhart and Russia 549
ture conflicts on that continent. This was basically thc same
reasoning expressed by William Borah, the most prominent
senatorial advocate of Russian recognition." Brookhart's argu-
ments, however, carried no more influence with the administra-
tion than those of Borah.
Diplomatic relations with Russia had been severed by the
Wilson Administration following the Bolshevik Revolution in
November of 1917. The basis of the American action was that the
Bolsheviks had confiscated American property, advocated world
revolution, and did not represent the majority of the Russian
people. The following excerpt from the instructions of Secretary
of State Robert Lansing to the American Ambassador in England
captures very well the hostility expressed by the United States
toward the Bolshevik Revolution.
The revulsion felt by the civilized world against the tyranny now holding
Russia in its power is shared by this government. This tyranny disre-
gards all principles upon which dealings and relations between nations
are founded and is not freely chosen by any considerable part of the
people of Russia."
The election of Warren Harding to the Presidency in 1920
produced no major change in American policy toward Russia.
Following the unexpected death of President Harding on August
3. 1923. Calvin Coolidge quickly demonstrated that be planned
no changes in the position formulated by Harding. In a press
conference on August 31, Coolidge declared there would be no
alterations in the American policy toward Russia. He described
the American attitude as awaiting the establishment of a Russian
government, that according to American standards, would war-
rant recognition.^'
In view of the administration's policy. Brookhart's Russian
initiative was rejected. Brookhart's activities also aroused the
hostility of many Americans who had been concerned since 1917
with Russian threats of subversion. Many citizens, no doubt, were
shocked to witness a United States senator extolling the virtues of
"Borah's basic line of reasoning on Russia can be found in the Congressional
Record. 68 Cong., 1 Sess. (1923-1924), LXV. 583-584.
^"Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. ¡920
(Washington. D.C, 1936), 111,462.
"Howard H, Quint and Robert H. Ferrell (eds.). The Talkative President:
The Off-The-Record Press Conferences of Calvin Coolidge (ktahersi, 1964), 255.
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Lenin and urging a change in the American policy toward the
Soviets.
Brookhart was denounced by many press sources and leading
citizens. The New York Times agreed with Brookhart's Iowa
adversary. Senator Cummins, who said "If his powers were
commensurate with his apparent desires, the Government would
not last a fortnight." *^ Samuel Gompers, whose American Federa-
tion of Labor was bitterly opposed to Russian recognition, main-
tained that no elements of a free government existed in Russia.
Gompers found it hard to understand how Brookhart could
comment favorably upon that forlorn country.^" Even the liberal
New Republic, usually friendly to the Soviet government, argued
that Hughes' negative reply to Brookhart's plea for recognition
was reasonable.'"
Brookhart's critics were also active in his home state of Iowa.
B. F. Carroll, a former governor of the state, said that Brookhart
was absurd in believing that he could understand the situation in
Russia during a visit of such short duration.'' More serious
charges were being made in Iowa against Brookhart by Alexander
Schwartz, a Chautauqua speaker who claimed to be a former
associate of Lenin. Schwartz felt that Brookhart had been
deceived by Russian interpreters who allowed the senator to ob-
serve only conditions that would reflect favorably upon the
Bolshevik regime. Brookhart had not been exposed to the actual
situation in Russia." It is interesting to note that the accusations
of Schwartz were later to be repeated in another period of extreme
anti-communism. During the 1950s an editorial in the Annals of
Iowa charged that Brookhart had been duped by the commun-
ists, and that through his activities Iowa had indirectly contri-
buted to the spread of communist subversion in the United
States."
Smith Brookhart, however, was not intimidated by those who
feared the Bolsheviks. He did not retreat from his advocation of
"New York Times. July 19. 1923.
'-Nation s Business. XII (Feb.. 1924). 9.
'"New Republic XXXV (Aug. 1, 1923), 243.
^'Des Moines Register. July 24, 1923.
"Ibid., July 26. 1923.
""Brookhart's Interest in Russia." Annals of Iowa, XXXII (Jan.. 1954).
230-232.
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recognizing Russia, and confronted the charges made against
him. On July 28,1923. he addressed a crowd of 5.000 members of
the Iowa Farmers Union in Eldon, Iowa. He described the im-
proved conditions he had observed in Russia, and replied to the
allegation that he had been deceived by Russian interpreters. The
senator insisted that he was allowed freedom of travel in Russia
and mingled among the peasants without interference. His staff
of interpreters consisted of an American relief worker, and
several Russians who expressed to the senator that they were
actually opposed to the Bolsheviks.'^
Brookhart was not afraid to communicate his opinions to his
constituency. Besides his speech at Eldon. he prepared an article
on Russia for the state publication of the American Legion. In the
article he argued that recognition would bring stability to Europe,
and that the Soviet regime was certainly preferable to Czarism.
Brookhart admitted that the Russians would have to make some
changes in their governmental structure, but certainly this should
not seem unusual to Americans, who had changed their govern-
ment by nineteen amendments to the Constitution.^^
Although Brookhart had been condemned by leading news-
papers, a major labor leader, and a former governor, many
people in Iowa did not seem to perceive Brookhart's diplomacy as
a danger to American security. The Des Moines Register in July
of 1923 printed many letters of support for Brookhart. Faith in
Brookhart was expressed in simple terms in the following excerpt
from one of the letters. "Smith Brookhart. our junior Senator, is
a good man and honest. He went to Europe to study conditions,
and he comes back to tell us what he thinks is best for the Senate
to do."'" Another letter condemned former Governor Carroll for
attacking Brookhart. While admitting that Brookhart did some-
times make mistakes, the writer concluded.". . . he is honest and
a man with a vision, with a single desire to help those in distress,
and one who can see good in the common people."" The letters
supporting Brookhart do not express a knowledge of Russia or
foreign affairs, but they do communicate a sense of trust in his
''Des Moines Register, July 29. 1923.
''New York Times. September 28. 1923.
^"Des Moines Register, July 25. 1923.
"Ibid.. July 26. 1923.
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honesty. They also reveal a sense of respect for Brookhart's
concern with the common fnan.
The furor caused by Brookhart's statements on Russia soon
faded as public attention turned toward the 1924 election. The
senator was up for re-election in 1924 (his election in 1922 had
been only for the unexpired term of Senator William Kenyon who
had resigned). In the 1924 general election, Brookhart defeated
his Democratic opponent by only 700 votes. However, the Senate,
on an appeal, ruled against Brookhart. It was the contention of
the Senate that many voters selecting the straight Republican
ticket had, nevertheless, shown intent to vote for the Democratic
senatorial candidate. The hostility of many voters and the Senate
was not so much a result of Brookhart's Russian policy (which
had not been a campaign issue), but his decision to bolt the
Republican party and support Robert LaFoUette for the
Presidency.^*
Brookhart's political career, however, had not ended. In
1926, campaigning on the issue of restoring agricultural prosper-
ity to Iowa farmers, Brookhart was returned to the Senate. He
renewed his crusade for a change in American policy toward
Russia. While Brookhart had been out of public office, the
negative attitude on the part of the American government toward
recognition had not altered. Trade between the two nations had
increased significantly. The total value of American exports to
Russia had increased from $7,308,389 in 1923 to $49,735,269 in
1926, yet there was basically no change in governmental policy,
which still emphasized the threat of Russian subversion and
propaganda." Secretary of State Frank Kellogg in a 1928
communication to the Republican National Committee reiterated
the American fear of subversion.
It is the conviction ofthe Government of the United States that relations
on a basis usual between friendly nations can not be established with a
governmental entity which is the agency of a group who hold it as their
mission to bring about the overthrow of the existing political, economic
and social order throughout the world and who regulate their conduct
towards other nations accordingly.'"
The policy enunciated by Kellogg was criticized by Brookhart
"Neprash. Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa. 1920-1926, 48-52.
^"Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations ofthe United States. ¡928 (Wash-
ington. D . C , 1943). I l l , 825.
"•¡hid,. 822.
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in a major senatorial address. The Iowa senator asserted that it
was Americans, rather than Russians, who had historically, more
frequently issued revolutionary propaganda. He argued that
during the American Revolution statements were made that
America would overthrow the monarchies of Europe. This type of
propaganda has continued into the present in Fourth of July
speeches, he asserted, and was evident in President Wilson's
appeal to the German people to overthrow the Kaiser.
Concerning the American claim that Russia should compensate
Americans for property confiscated during the Russian
Revolution, Brookhart declared that Russia possessed even
stronger claims against the United States because of our
intervention in Russia under President Wilson. Brookhart
concluded that it was American aid and encouragement to
counter-revolutionary forces that produced the bloody and
destructive confrontations ofthe Russian Revolution.*'
Brookhart claimed that conditions in Russia were improving.
According to him, crime and graft had become almost nonexis-
tent in Russia. The production of large industries, and the output
of coal and oil had surpassed pre-war levels. These gains he said,
were due to the growth of the cooperative movement in Russia.
He noted that before the war Russian cooperatives had 650.000
shareholders, but in 1927 the number of shareholders had in-
creased to 7,379,000.-" The Russian adoption of the cooperative
idea had been the key to Russian economic progress, and Brook-
hart maintained that if America would follow the same practice,
big business' control ofthe nation would be abolished.*^
U ft
Brookhart was defeated in a re-election bid in 1932 by an
electorate demanding governmental action to relieve the
Depression. Brookhart's opponent argued that the senator said
much about the Depression, but instituted little action to alter the
situation. Additionally, Brookhart's usual reputation for honesty
was undermined by a charge of nepotism. In the midst of the
Depression, issues such as recognition of Russia were dropped
from the campaign. ^ ^
"CongressionalRecord. 70 Cong., 2 Sess. (1928-1929). LXX, I 573
"¡bid.. 1,578. '^Ihid., 1,574.
""Playing Brookhart Out With a Steam Calliope," Literary Digest, CXIII
(June 18, 1932), 5.
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Following his defeat in 1932, Brookhart was again actively
concerned with the problem of Russian relations. In May of 1933
he secured a position as a special adviser to the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.
The Iowan was expected to seek an expanded market for surplus
American agricultural products in Russia. Brookhart predicted
that if adequate credits were extended to her, Russia would
become an excellent consumer of American eotton. livestock, and
manufactured articles."* The Russian market envisioned by
Brookhart did not materialize, however, as the expected credits
were not extended.
Although he approved of the Roosevelt Administration's
recognition of Russia in November of 1933, he withdrew from the
administration because of his opposition to the New Deal
program of crop reduction. The solution of the farm problem,
according to Brookhart, was in controlling the profits of the
middleman, and not the production of the farmer. He was unable
to renew his political career after being defeated in the 1936 Iowa
Republican senatorial primary. Crushed by this defeat, Brook-
hart retired to private law practice until his death in 1944. Why
was Brookhart attracted to Russia? It is important to realize that
his main concern during his senatorial career was the plight of
Iowa farmers following thc disastrous price decline that began in
the summer of 1920. Corn, the main staple of Iowa farmers, de-
clined from a selling price of $1.20 per bushel in 1919 to $0.47 per
bushel by the end of 1920."" The price collapse of corn was not a
temporary market dislocation. At the conclusion of the decade,
corn remained at the low price of $0.70 per bushel, with the
average price per bushel from 1923 to 1927 resting at the low level
of $0.67. "^Equally disastrous conditions beset the price of wheat.
Iowa farmers received $2 per bushel for wheat in 1919. but the
price fell to $1.40 per bushel in 1920.•" By 1929, the price of
wheat had slumped to the extremely low level of $1.06 per
"New York Times. May 8. 1933.
"United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture. 1925
(Washington. D.C, 1926). 799,
"United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture. 1930
(Washington. D.C, 1930), 629,
'•United States Department of Agriculture. Yearbook of Agriculture. ¡925.
764.
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bushel.•''' The cause of this depression was simply that American
agriculture had expanded to meet the needs of European markets
during World War I, and after the war was over, European
farmers returned to cultivating the soil, and Europe no longer
needed to import large American grain surpluses.***
Brookhart may have thought that the recognition of Russia
would provide a market for excess American grain. Although a
logical interpretation, it does not coincide with the facts. Russia
was not in fact a good market for American grain supplies.
Brookhart, touring Russia in 1923, had predicted that Russian
cooperatives would encourage greater production and prosperity
for Russian agriculture. Since American corn exports to Russia
fell from 3,392 bushels in 1923 to zero in 1924 there was some
validity to his prediction. The same trend was evident in wheat
transactions, as the amount of wheat exported to Russia declined
from 85,274 bushels in 1923 to zero in 1924.*' Meanwhile,
Russian corn and wheat production was increasing. The average
production of corn in Russia during the pre-war years of
1909-1913 was 52,185,000 bushels, while under the Soviet
government corn production had increased to 133,022,000
bushels by 1927." A similar situation was evident in the Russian
wheat crop. Production increased from a pre-war average of
607,828,000 bushels in 1909-1913 to a level of 751,920,000
bushels in 1927."
Smith Brookhart foresaw the Russian increase în production,
yet he still urged diplomatic recognition. The reason must He in
his allegiance to the concept of cooperative marketing. He praised
the cooperative idea in international terms. He urged American
farmers to follow the example set by farmers and peasants in
Denmark and Russia. He seemed to envision a world of producers
trading equitably without interference of middlemen and
businessmen in world trade. In Brookhart's thought, big business
"United States Department of Agriculture. Yearbook of Agriculture. ¡930,
600.
»•James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis. ¡919-1923 (Berkeley, 1957), 10-19.
^'United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture. ¡925
1268-1269.
"United States Department of Agriculture. Yearbook of Agriculture. 1930,
630.
''Ibid, 603.
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in the United States was behind the American refusal to recognize
Russia. Business interests feared that if the common man in
America learned of the successes of the Russian cooperative
movement, then the cooperative idea would spread through the
country.*'
Brookhart's interest in Russia was based fundamentally upon
the same ideas which Marian C. McKenna argues governed
William Borah's sympathy for the Soviet government. McKenna
says that Borah saw the Russian Revolution as an attempt by the
lower class to increase its power and better its condition. " Brook-
hart, too. viewed the Russian Revolution as a movement to bene-
fit the common man. He considered the cooperative concept as a
liberating force. Thus, he glorified the Russian experiment.
Russia is at work, and Russia under this government, however much you
may condemn it, is coming back; and this property and this wealth as it
is produced in Russia belongs to the people of Russia, and not to a few
individuals who have acquired it through corporation organization, or
through economic combinations or through special favors of laws of
their country."
This is the same dream that Brookhart had for the agricultural
producers of Iowa, and indeed all the producersof the world.
Smith Brookhart's agrarian background apparently did not
influence him toward isolationism. His attitude was an exception
to the trend which linked agrarianism with isolationism. Al-
though Brookhart did not support such formal international
bodies as the League of Nations and the World Court, he felt a
sense of common bond with 'agricultural producers throughout
the world. He believed that the way to unite and free the common
man was through the adoption of cooperative marketing on a
global scale.
Brookhart did not seem to fit into the midwestern tradition of
self-reliant agrarian individualism. He ascribed to Utopian visions
of a world of producers united by the cooperative movement. The
Iowa senator, in common with many Utopian thinkers, failed to
formulate a political program to deal with the problems he de-
fined. He believed that recognition of Russia would benefit the
cooperative movement both there and in America, but he never
adequately explained how this diplomatic process would foster
cooperative development.
"Congressional Record. 70 Cong., 2 Sess. (1928-1929), LXX. 1.574.
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